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ABSTRACT 
Availability requires that computer systems remain functioning as expected without 
degradation in processing, access, or availability of resources to legitimate users. Although 
many organizations may have implemented good security practices in building their 
networks, these networks still remain open to common assault tools that threaten the 
availability of network services to legitimate users. Over time, many of these availability 
assaults, also known as denial of service (DoS) attacks, have grown more complex, effective, 
and even easier to launch. 
Unfortunately, the number of published attacks continues to grow while few security 
researchers firmly understand their details. If properly compiled into an effective database, 
the collection of these different attack scripts could possibly provide valuable information to 
computer security engineers such as characterizing threats in terms of source, attack method, 
and effects on computer resources. Using the attack database, it is also possible to begin to 
build a taxonomy of common denial of service attacks and develop a general methodology 
for describing and characterizing such threats. Although various research studies have been 
previously conducted in hopes of building a general software vulnerability database for use 
by security analysts, no studies have specifically focused on studying attack histories. 
By examining DoS attack history, genealogy, and taxonomy together, researchers 
gain the ability to not only identify existing attacks and possible countermeasures but 
possibly even predict future attacks in some cases as well. Although attacks have grown 
increasingly complex over time, many of the same basic ideas and methods for performing 
the denial of service remain unchanged or only slightly modified. While previous research 
models had focused on attacks as singular data points, modeling assaults as growing 
genealogical trees formed from several different software attacks yields valuable information 
on recurring themes in DoS attacks. Furthermore, attack tree hierarchies allow researchers 
the ability to study how software vulnerability exploits have changed over time. Building a 
vulnerability database of denial of service attacks comprised of both singular entries and 
corresponding attack trees allows for the development of classifications in the taxonomies of 
vulnerabilities and reveals characteristics of attacks that have remained prevalent in software 
over time. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As the connectivity of computers continues to grow at enormous rates and the 
functionality of computer networks continues to expand, users are beginning to increasingly 
rely on the communication infrastructure. Through the use of computer networks, users 
access computer resources from remote office locations, citizens access news across the 
globe, and others share the ability to interact with new people all online. While maintaining 
the ability to reliably transmit and receive data across these computer networks has long been 
emphasized by designers, achieving these goals securely is perhaps a more recent focus. 
Secure computers are those computing systems which can be depended upon and 
behave as expected to (1]. In other words, the user expects to be able to reliably interact with 
software on his or her system and transmit and receive data with other sources. However, 
some of the main issues of concern in any data communication network is confidentiality, 
privacy, and availability [2]. In order to achieve confidentiality, data must be protected such 
that only those authorized and legitimate users have the ability to access it. Likewise, 
achieving data integrity requires that information be protected from being altered in any way 
either by unauthorized user or by accident. Over the last few years, many organizations have 
expended considerable resources to protect internal infrastructure from such external 
compromise (3]. However, maintaining availability of computer and network resources still 
remains as an even more challenging task. 
Problem Statement 
Availability requires that computer systems remain functioning as expected without 
degradation in processing, access, or availability of resources to legitimate users. Although 
many organizations may have implemented well planned and good security practices in 
building their networks, these networks still remain open to common availability attacks. In 
other words, traditionally well-protected infrastructures all suffer from vulnerabilities in 
maintaining availability. In fact the existence of previous security practices and management 
plans may indeed actually make the network more vulnerable to attack due to the false 
pretense of immunity. 
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Many of these assaults, otherwise known as denial of service (DoS) attacks, are 
commonly published on a wide variety oflntemet and security web sites. In fact many sites 
freely advertise and distribute easy-to-use attack scripts. Web-surfers, who may know little 
to nothing of the technical details of the attack, can easily download the scripts and launch 
large bombardments against computer networks and computer systems. As a result, many 
attacks are easy to carry out and may even occur on a relatively frequent basis, simply going 
unreported. Furthermore, these assaults have grown increasingly more complex and 
effective over the past few years. With an increased understanding of how systems work, 
intruders have become skilled at determining weaknesses in systems and exploiting them [4]. 
As new security measures are implemented, new attacks begin to appear. 
If properly compiled into an effective database, the large collection of attack scripts 
widely available on the Internet could possibly provide valuable information to computer 
security researchers. The collection, commonly referred to as the Global Attack Toolkit 
(GAT), could be used to generate statistics on important characteristics of attacks, such as 
what percentage of attacks are launchable from a Windows host, what percentage are remote 
penetration attacks, or what percentage use common communication protocols such as 
common TCP [5]. By composing a threat database, researchers have the ability to 
specifically analyze how attacks occur and model how such attacks can be prevented. 
Furthermore, by characterizing threats in terms of source, attack method, and effects on 
computer resources, researchers have the ability to select common high-level threats and set 
objectives for responding to attacks. 
Thesis Statement 
Using the attack database, it is also possible to begin to build a taxonomy of common 
denial of service attacks and develop a general methodology for describing and 
characterizing such threats. Currently, several hundred denial of service attacks exist, over 
300 of which have been catalogued here. However, little is known about these attacks other 
than the fact that they exist [5]. By classifying existing threats, researchers gain the ability to 
understand the structure behind DoS attacks and how such threats have changed in 
functionality over the past several years. More importantly though, security engineers can 
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examine attacks for common instances that different attack denial of service tools and scripts 
may share, how different assaults relate, and how attacks have changed over time. 
Although various research studies have been previously conducted in hopes of 
building a general software vulnerability database for use by security engineers, analysts, and 
law enforcement officials, no studies have specifically focused on studying attack histories. 
Research conducted by Ivan Krsul [6], Peter Mell [5], Tom Richardson [13], and others have 
all focused on compiling vulnerabilities into databases and analyzing the entries for common 
characteristics in aim of building attack classification taxonomies. For example Krsul 
describes his software vulnerability analysis as "a framework for the development of 
taxonomies according to generally accepted principles [that] can be used to develop 
unambiguous classifications" [6]. By characterizing existing threats and increasing our 
understanding of the nature of software vulnerabilities, software developers can hopefully 
improve the design of products to withstand such attacks in the future. 
However, unlike those previous research projects aimed primarily at developing only 
attack and vulnerability taxonomies, the purpose of this research project was not only to 
continue to refine denial of service attack taxonomies, but more importantly to study how 
denial of service tools have changed over time. By examining DoS attack history and 
taxonomy together, researchers gain the ability to not only identify existing attacks and 
possible countermeasures but possibly even predict future attacks in some cases as well. 
Although attacks have grown increasingly complex over time, many of the same basic ideas 
and methods for performing the denial of service remain unchanged or only slightly 
modified. Building a taxonomy of Internet denial of service threats avoids confusion 
between researchers and coordinates development efforts of security mechanisms. While 
previous research models had focused on denial of service attacks as singular data points, 
modeling attacks as growing genealogical trees formed from several different software 
attacks yields valuable information on recurring themes in DoS attacks. Furthermore, attack 
tree hierarchies allow researchers the ability to study how software vulnerability exploits 
have changed, migrated, and increased in complexity over time. Building a vulnerability 
database of denial of service attacks comprised of both singular entries and corresponding 
4 
attack trees allows for the development of classifications in the taxonomies of vulnerabilities 
and reveals characteristics of attacks that have remained prevalent in software over time. 
Thesis Organization 
The remainder of the research presentation is organized to give the reader a firm 
background in the denial of service attacks and previous research as well as present the new 
ideas formulated by the thesis. Chapter 2 thoroughly establishes the mechanisms of denial of 
service attack as well as expanding on research conducted by others. Furthermore, Chapter 3 
establishes the database structure and hierarchy used to conduct the thesis research. Chapter 
4 details many of the past trends noted in the attack taxonomy as well as the recurring themes 
within the specific categories of the taxonomy. By the same token, Chapter 5 discusses 
several important recurring themes in the genealogical attack trees, while Chapter 6 notes 
important countermeasure steps to prepare for such assaults and makes recommendations on 
future work. Finally, Chapter 7 presents a general conclusion to the research study and 
thesis. 
5 
BACKGROUND 
In February of 2000, a series of massive availability attacks incapacitated several 
high-profile Internet sites, including Yahoo, Ebay, and E*trade. Next, in January of 2001, 
Microsoft's name server infrastructure was disabled by a similar assault [7]. Since 
September 1996, several dozen sites on the Internet have been subjected to a denial of service 
attack [8]. The attacks can be launched with little effort and are often difficult to trace back 
to the originator. Furthermore, it is never necessary for the attacker to explicitly break any 
security mechanism in place to exploit the vulnerability. Complex and strong authentication 
mechanisms that provide data confidentiality and integrity are often rendered useless in 
availability attacks since the enemy never actually needs to compromise the computer system 
security. 
Definition 
The primary goal of an availability attack is simply to deny victims access to a 
particular computer resource. The enemy never needs to supply a password, secure token, or 
other means of authentication; the attacker only needs to block other users from accessing the 
system. A denial of service attack is characterized by an explicit attempt by attackers to 
prevent users of a service from using that service [9]. For example, flooding a network with 
traffic prevents other computing systems from communicating on the same network and 
thereby disrupts normal network services. In this scenario the attacker never needs to 
authenticate with any computer system. They simply overload normal resources and 
effectively block communication. 
Note that not all availability attacks are necessarily denial of service attacks. Many 
other attacks may include a denial of service as a component [9]. Often an availability attack 
is simply an indirect result of a larger attack goal. For example, an attacker exploiting a 
software vulnerability on a web server may exhaust all memory resources and deny other 
web surfers access, but they may be doing so with the overall purpose of gaining system 
privileges to the server. Likewise illegitimate use of computing resources may also result in 
denial of service [9]. For instance, users who set up anonymous FTP servers on public 
computing systems often subject the server to such intense traffic that disk space and CPU 
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resources are quickly exhausted. Furthermore, DoS attacks can target any computing system 
including application software, operating system, hardware, network devices, and the 
network protocol itself. 
Denial of service attacks can disable any computer from performing normal system 
routines or accessing data across network resources. Furthermore, launching many denial of 
service attacks often require little in the way of computing resources, even against large and 
sophisticated servers. Given the goals of denial of service attacks, exploitation of the 
vulnerabilities typically occur by taking advantage of process recovery, crashing a particular 
process in the information flow, or overloading a system resource such that information 
flows in a very untimely fashion. 
Designed Outage 
Many computing devices commonly possess some means of process recovery such as 
a system reset function or manual override. These functions perform a temporary shutdown 
and reload of all necessary services for the device. Likewise these functions are included by 
engineers as part of the system by design in order to maintain steady state. For example, any 
TCP session requires a sender and receiver address as well as a sender and receiver port. At 
the end of the session, the system closes the connection by not only closing the current 
session but also by prohibiting any future connections on those particular port addresses for a 
specific period of time. Here the goal is to perform the steady state of communication on the 
system by reducing conflicts between simultaneous and later connections. The overall 
purpose of designed outage is reduced system errors and error recovery. 
However, denial of service attacks can take an unfair advantage over designed outage 
functions by using them maliciously [10]. For example, malicious code could call a process 
to hang or reset a system. Likewise a more common denial of service attack is IP spoofing 
and blocking. If an attacker assumes the IP address of a receiving system and sends multiple 
forged data packets on the receiving system's or victim's behalf, he or she has the ability to 
drop the communication session between the sending and receiving systems, thereby denying 
legitimate communication service. 
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Resource Destruction 
Given the complexity of modem software packages, hundreds of known and 
unknown flaws exist in release versions of commercial programs. Resource destruction 
occurs when a program crashes [10]. By exploiting uncovered flaws in software programs, 
attackers have the ability trigger system failures. For instance, Hewlett Packard 
manufactures network hardware, commonly referred to as JetDirects, which enable network 
printer sharing of standard printers with only parallel interfaces. However, a flaw discovered 
in the J etDirect software demonstrated a vulnerability where any user connecting to the 
device with an FTP client could effectively cause a complete device failure. In fact the 
JetDirect would require a complete reset before functioning properly. 
Attackers have the ability to remotely force destructive states in software simply by 
exploiting vulnerabilities and flaws in system software and hardware. Likewise in some 
cases, intruders can manipulate configuration information in order to prevent a legitimate 
user from accessing resources. For example, if an intruder can change the routing 
information on the network devices, they may be able to effectively disable network 
communication. In other cases, attackers who modify the registry on a Windows machine 
may gain the ability to disable certain system functions [9]. In extreme cases, resource 
destruction can even consist of the physical destruction of computing resources. 
Resource Exhaustion 
Even in cases of well designed software and proven security algorithms, resource 
exhaustion attacks can effectively deny service without ever exploiting software 
vulnerabilities or compromising system security. In these attack scenarios, attackers rapidly 
consume scarce, limited, or non-renewable computing system or network resources. DoS 
attacks are most frequently executed against network connectivity, where the goal is to 
prevent hosts from communicating on the network by exhausting the systems resources [ 11]. 
Any process that requests more of a memory or CPU resource can then be denied simply by 
consuming all available resources on a system. 
For example a common resource exhaustion threat prevalently exploited by attackers 
is the SYN-Flood attack. During the assault, attackers simply exhaust memory and CPU 
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resources of the victim system through opening several bogus connections with the server. 
According to the TCP communication protocol, a communication is established through a 
series of three packet exchanges, commonly referred to as a three-way handshake. Typically 
a connection request is made by the client to the server. The server then responds with an 
acknowledgement to the client, who then follows with the final packet in the three-way 
handshake exchange. An attacker initiates a SYN flood attack by sending many connections 
requests with spoofed addresses to the victim machine [12]. Each time a connection request 
is made, the server allocates system resources to the client request and respond with an 
acknowledgement. However, in this case the client never responds with any additional data. 
Instead the attacker only responds with several more connection requests until eventually the 
server reaches a limit on half-open connections or exhausts all available system resources. 
Due to the lack of authentication in the TCP/IP protocol, attackers have the ability to carry 
out attacks that place undue burdens on system computing resources. 
In other cases, attackers may actually use a system's own computing resources 
against it in order to deny service. For example, in the Chargen attack the intruder uses 
forged UDP packets to connect the echo service on one machine to the chargen service on 
another machine [ 11]. The two services interact continuously such that all available network 
bandwidth is consumed completely between the two machines. Thus, the network 
connectivity for all machines on the same networks as either of the targeted machines may be 
affected [11]. By utilizing two simple and legitimate services on established computing 
machines, attackers can force the machines to begin performing unexpectedly, creating 
adverse effects for others. 
Although launching attacks from a remote location which consume all available 
network bandwidth may be difficult to do from a single client machine today, the 
vulnerability of network availability attacks still exist. By simply generating a large number 
of data frames on the computer network, attackers have the ability to maximize the current 
bandwidth of any network. Typically, these packets are ICMP ECHO packets, but in 
principle they may be anything [9]. In fact, new attacks exist which coordinate distributed 
functions through hordes of controlled machines to exhaust network resources. Modem 
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attacks coordinate the packet generation through several machines on different networks in 
order to overload the victim's bandwidth and effectively deny service. 
Likewise, in addition to consuming large amounts of network bandwidth, malicious 
users can also consume other system resources as well. As previously mentioned the SYN-
Flood attack exhausts resources that prevent network connectivity. Likewise, intruders can 
also consume other normal computing system resources as well. For example, email 
solicitation to all users on a particular server rapidly generates an excessive number of 
messages, thereby consuming a large quantity of disk space. 
Moreover, many times attackers will use the same security mechanisms already 
implemented on a network in order to effectively cause resource exhaustion attacks. For 
example, intrusion detection systems examine current network traffic for commonly known 
attack exploits. Once an attack exploit is identified error messages are displayed and logged 
with the system administrator. Once again by generating bogus attack traffic, an intruder 
could possibly slow intrusion detection systems and exhaust disk resources. Likewise, many 
sites have scheme in place to lockout an account after a failed number oflogin attempts [9]. 
After a user consistently enters their password incorrectly, within a given time period, the 
account is disabled. While often such lockouts are a good security practice to prevent 
intruders from guessing user passwords, the same security mechanism can be used to launch 
an attack where the enemy enters wrong passwords on behalf of the user thereby disabling 
their account. 
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DEVELOPMENT OF A TAXONOMY 
The focus of the research was on remotely exploitable attacks. In other words, only 
attacks which disable availability of computer resources to legitimate users by attacking 
some vulnerability from a remote network location were considered as applicable. The intent 
was to build a database of such attacks, sort attacks into specific categories, and most 
importantly study how the attacks changed over time. Previous research noted limitations of 
vulnerability databases in that all database entries were listed as being singular. When an 
exploit is posted on one of the online sites, it ends up being just one entry into the database; 
there is no indication of how popular that form attack is and how often it may be used in the 
subsequent days, weeks, and months after its posting [13]. In other words, by studying the 
temporal data of relationships between attacks and attack history, it is possible to model how 
attacks actively changed over time. 
Database Structure 
Often after a software vulnerability is discovered and published, exploitation attacks 
are developed by either malicious programmers or security engineers to demonstrate the 
weakness. Over time these attacks migrate and spread throughout different Internet security 
groups, individuals, and websites. Consequently, the attacks are often modified by other 
programmers to increase effectiveness, expand the attack to different software platforms, or 
even incorporate other denial of service models. As software vendors release fixes that 
repair vulnerabilities uncovered by the attack exploits, tools are also subsequently replaced or 
changed as new techniques are discovered to exploit other weaknesses. 
Thus the vulnerability research database had a dual purpose of providing information 
on the attack as well as information on the attack taxonomy structure and relationship to 
other attacks. Important vulnerabilities matching the remote exploitation and denial of 
service criteria that were reported between 1997 and 2001 were compiled in the database 
along with information pertaining to attack publication date, software attacker platform, 
~;oftware victim platform, attack categorization type, and attack details. In addition, attacks 
were specifically studied and compared to other previous and existing attacks to help build 
historical and genealogical hierarchies of software vulnerability exploits. Previous taxonomy 
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research performed by Richardson, Krsul, and others was of little help here. As mentioned 
before, existing software vulnerability databases contained only singular entries. Instead of 
simply compiling data on software vulnerability details, attack scripts and exploit source 
codes were specifically analyzed and compared to build genealogical hierarchies and predict 
future denial of service tools. 
Database Categories 
Building an attack taxonomy necessitates the need for attack categories to simplify 
database design and research. Rather than rely on the vulnerability types previously 
discussed, several more descriptive categories were implemented in characterizing attacks. 
These categories, derived from the previous work of Richardson, include specification 
weakness, implementation weakness, and brute force attacks. Of those attacks, both brute 
force and specification weakness attacks are perhaps the hardest to overcome. Each detail 
the inherent weaknesses in software design and protocol specification that directly threaten 
securing the availability of computing resources. 
Specification Weakness 
In specification weakness attacks, vulnerabilities often exist in the definition of a 
network protocol or software algorithm itself. Often, the attack performs a legitimate 
operation that may go unhandled by the network protocol, or perhaps the attack exploits a 
weakness in the protocol definition. For example, DNS spoofing is a malicious attack often 
performed to deny the appropriate user service. The attack is legitimate in the sense that the 
attacker is performing a legitimate DNS operation. However, in this case no strong 
authentication mechanism was built into the DNS and IP protocols that would prevent such 
an attack. Likewise, the recent publication of vulnerabilities in the WEP protocol outlines 
specific problems in protecting data confidentiality on wireless networks [14]. Here, a 
protocol design flaw in improperly implementing a shared key encryption scheme allows 
attackers to remotely spy on data communication. Hence incomplete or ambiguous protocol 
specification may lead to inadvertent security vulnerabilities. 
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Because the designers of protocols are often either not familiar with security or 
simply unconcerned with the issue, protocol specifications are typically susceptible to either 
authentication, modification, or, as in our case, availability attacks. For example, in the case 
ofWEP design, engineers did not invite any security experts to take part in the design or 
certification of the privacy algorithm. As a result, the encryption scheme used to protect 
wireless networks today is susceptible to assault. Likewise, designers of the TCP protocol 
did not foresee security considerations during the design of the fragmentation specification. 
Several popular attacks exist which set the fragment size of a TCP communication 
interchange to abnormal sizes. Since the specification for implementation of the protocol 
does not specify fragment offset validation, it is often possible for an attacker to exhaust 
system resources on the vulnerable host simply by modifying the data pointers to 
unreasonable values. 
For the purpose of this study, a specification weakness attack is any attempt by a 
malicious user to directly take advantage of a flaw, weakness, or security vulnerability in the 
design or specification of a network, service, or communication protocol. It is extremely 
important to note that specification weakness attacks do not include those attacks where the 
software or hardware designers utilizing the protocol incorrectly implement the specification. 
Instead this category includes those attacks where the protocol designers have incompletely, 
ambiguously, or mistakenly specified the implementation. Attacks which specifically exploit 
a flaw in the implementation of protocol specification fall into a separate category known as 
implementation weaknesses. Specification weakness attacks are only those malicious efforts 
which expressly focus on exploiting inherent flaws in the protocol design. 
Brute Force 
On the other hand, brute force attacks often do not rely on exploiting any specific 
software or protocol vulnerability. Instead, the attacks are once again completely legitimate 
according to the engineering design specifications. However, brute force attacks simply 
function by overwhelming the victim with the illegitimate use of resources in an entirely 
legitimate fashion. For instance, an attacker could overwhelm a web server with several 
hundred connection requests in a very short period of time. Such an attack quickly exhausts 
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the resources of the victim to a point were responses to other normal user requests can no 
longer be made. Brute force attacks are extremely dangerous given the fact that most 
assaults are extremely effective and no strong countermeasure currently exists. 
Often it can be difficult to distinguish some brute force attacks from specification 
weakness attacks. For example, in the classic Squid attack, an assaulter can effectively deny 
service to legitimate users simply by exhausting system resources on the victim machine. 
Since TCP implementations are designed with a small limit on how many open connections 
per port are possible at any give time, an attacker may initiate a Squid attack by sending 
multiple connection requests to the victim machine in a short period of time. In this scenario, 
the protocol is indeed being exploited since no means of authentication has been 
implemented by the TCP designers. However, the attack is only effective as a brute force 
means of exhausting system resources. In order to be entirely successful, the attacker must 
demonstrate the ability to make connection requests faster than the victim can allocate 
system resources to those requests. In other words, the enemy needs to continuously keep 
requesting new connections from the victim machine for the length of the attack [12]. More 
importantly though, once the attacker ceases connection requests and the victim has time to 
respond to those invalid requests and free system resources, the overall attack ceases as well. 
For the purpose of this research study, a brute force attack is any attempt made by a 
malicious user to overflow or deplete computing, memory, or network resources by some 
forceful and exhaustive means that relies on the attackers own processing power and network 
bandwidth and the limitations of the system and network resources of the victim machine. 
While other attacks maintain effectiveness until both the victim system is reset and the 
attacker ceases the denial of service attempt, brute force attacks often lose all effectiveness 
soon after the attacker stops efforts. Instead of relying on the exploitation of software and 
hardware vulnerabilities, brute force attacks simply overwhelm the victim's computer 
resources and deny service to other legitimate users. 
Implementation Weakness 
Finally implementation weakness attacks are perhaps the most prevalent. These 
attacks stem from specific software vulnerabilities that result from improper design 
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validation, poor engineering design, or even poor error recovery mechanisms. For example, 
popular buffer overflow attacks often exploit weaknesses in the software design that prevent 
improper data input by the user. Several attacks exist against Microsoft operating system 
software that allow malicious users to send improper data to the network protocol stack to 
cause the computing resource to deny service to other remote users. Because implementation 
weakness attacks exploit flaws in the software design itself, they are often fixed by vendors 
through the release of updated software packages and patches. Thus, implementation 
weakness attacks are perhaps some of the most important attacks to this study since many of 
the discovered attacks demonstrate migration and change over the research period. 
Implementation weakness attacks are the result of mistakes made by the software and 
hardware engineers. Often computing products are rushed to market without proper design 
verification and testing. During the lifetime of the product, users, researchers, and possibly 
malicious attackers may discover small flaws in the system design, known as vulnerabilities. 
By exploiting the design implementation vulnerability, an attacker could possibly either read 
or modify system data, or, as in our case again, deny computing resources to other users. 
Buffer overflows, format strings, Unicode, and other attacks all fall into this category. For 
example, supplying an unusually long string of arbitrary characters in the usemame field of a 
Novell iManage server will result in page fault exception error that effectively denies all 
other users access to system resources until the server is reset. Thus the iManage denial of 
service attack is the result of a design mistake by failing to perform proper input validation 
and buff er checking. 
More specifically though for the purpose of this research taxonomy, an 
implementation weakness attack is any exploitation of a hardware or software design flaw 
that directly threatens the availability of system resources. Unlike brute force attacks, 
implementation weakness attacks depend on neither the availability of resources by the 
attacker nor the exhaustion ofresources of the victim. Instead implementation weakness 
attacks simply exploit vulnerabilities in the design implementation that lead to critical errors 
forcing a system halt, reset, or resource exhaustion. 
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Attack Trees 
More important to refining a denial of service attack taxonomy, attacks were 
specifically studied for historical changes. In other words, how each assault, and DoS attack 
category for that matter, has changed over time with new technology, new software systems, 
and new security techniques. Instead of simply analyzing attacks for specific themes and 
characteristics and categorizing them accordingly, the primary research focus was on 
building attack trees, a hierarchical approach that attempts to trace the genealogy ofDoS 
attacks and study modifications in their design. By modeling denial of service attacks as 
growing trees comprised of several different attack generations and possibly different attack 
categories, researchers gain the ability to study both how software and hardware 
vulnerabilities have changed over time as well as the exploitation of those vulnerabilities. 
Building a vulnerability database of denial of service attacks comprised of not only 
singular categorical entries but growing attack tree hierarchies as well allows for the 
refinement of the taxonomy of vulnerabilities and reveals characteristics of denial of service 
attacks that have remained prevalent over time. Constructing attack graphs is a crucial part 
of doing vulnerability analysis of a network of hosts [15]. Because each path and node in the 
attack tree represents a slightly different means of achieving the desired denial of service, 
attack trees assess the overall availability vulnerabilities of a single network host. 
Developing attack trees which portray the genealogy of different denial of service attacks 
allows software and hardware designers to understand how both vulnerabilities and exploits 
have changed over time as well as concentrate on methods of predicting future attack 
patterns. 
Together both the taxonomy of denial of service attacks coupled with their tree 
structures allows for refining the classification of existing vulnerabilities and understanding 
their growth and origin. Most importantly attack trees provide a formal, methodical way of 
describing the security of systems, based on varying attacks [16]. In other words attack trees 
model the means of achieving the end goal of denial of service through slightly different 
means of approach. More formally defined, 
An attack graph or AG is a tuple G = (S, r, S0, Ss) where Sis a set of states, t c S x S 
is a transition relation, So ~ S is a set of initial states, and Ss ~ Sis a set of success 
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states. Intuitively Ss denotes the set of states where the intruder has achieved his 
goals. Unless otherwise stated we assume that the transition relation 'tis total. We 
define an execution fragment as a finite sequence of states sas1 ... sn such that (si, Si+J) 
E 't for all 0 ::;; i < n. An execution fragment with so E So is an execution, and an 
execution whose final state is in Ss is an attack, i.e., the execution corresponds to a 
sequence of atomic attacks leading to the intruder's goal state [15]. 
In other words attack graphs are data structures used to model all possible avenues of 
attacking a network. The graph offers a formal methodology for understanding the software 
vulnerability and how attacks exploit those vulnerabilities to achieve their goals. 
More specific to this study however, attack trees are defined as the set of states that 
identify all possible means of using a particular vulnerability to achieve a denial of service. 
Attack trees are structures comprised of singular nodes, or exploits, that all have the desired 
goal of causing a loss of availability. Unlike the general attack graph definition, attack trees 
do not outline every possible means of achieving the end success state. Instead, the trees 
illustrate the evolution of a single attack over time. In other words, attack trees represent the 
single process the enemies designed to reach the goal state. Unlike their attack graph 
counterparts, attack trees only represent the genealogy of an attack, or how the attack has 
shown modifications and grown in complexity overtime. 
Thus each attack tree begins with a root node of the goal state, a complete or partial 
denial of service, and one or more leaf nodes as means of achieving that desired goal. 
However each leaf node typically parented by another node which typically represents a 
more classical or conventional approach or a different means of conducting the same attack. 
For example, imagine that a criminal wishes to open a locked safe. While there may be 
several means of opening the safe through destruction, cutting, or explosives, the criminal 
wishes to open the locked safe through a single means of attack by cracking the combination. 
A wide variety of methods exist though for learning the combination of the safe as illustrated 
in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Safe Lock Attack Tree [16] 
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It is important to notice that several possible methods exist for conducting a single type of 
attack. The criminal can either steal the combination through eavesdrop or social 
engineering, or the attacker may possibly find the written combination by some other 
method. However, every child node stems from the parent attack method of cracking the 
combination. 
Historically many of the means of cracking the safe can change as well. For example, 
the criminal may gain several new automated lock-picking kits as new technology is 
developed or changes are made to the safe design. As a result the tree may grow several new 
child nodes that stem either from previous child nodes or the parent node itself as 
demonstrated in Figure 2. Such historical and genealogical changes to the attack tree are 
extremely important to this research as they may demonstrate how vulnerabilities and attacks 
have changed over time with new software and hardware technology. Even in the modified 
attack tree where new means of conducting the same attack have been developed, each node 
becomes a subgoal, and children of that node are ways to achieve that subgoal [16]. More 
simply, attack trees simply illustrate every possible procedure for using a specific means to 
launch an attack. 
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Figure 2. Modified Safe Lock Attack Tree 
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Unfortunately, developing a genealogical hierarchy of attack evolution is no simple 
task. Building the attack trees requires close examination of both the vulnerability description 
and exploit source code. However by building attack trees and studying their growth, 
evolution, and structure, researchers can determine not only likely methods of attack 
penetration but possibly predict future modifications to attacks as well. Much like security, 
attack trees are a process, or methodical method, of describing the vulnerabilities of any 
system, accounting for those which are most likely to occur, and repeating the entire process 
in a cycle fashion. 
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ATTACK DATABASE ANALYSIS 
Since the early 1990's, thousands of different software vulnerabilities have been 
discovered. Every day, new software vulnerabilities are published in online databases and 
attack toolkits are developed to exploit the problems. During 1998 approximately 27% of 
these attacks were remote denial of service exploits [5]. In other words, many of the attacks 
tools under development are designed with the goal of blocking availability to legitimate 
users. However until taxonomies were developed for studying these attacks little was known 
of their characteristics and origins. Even when a host was attacked, it was difficult to predict 
how the attack occurred [5]. Building the attack database allows researchers to gain 
important statistics on what attacks exist, what they target, and what procedure they use for 
reaching the goal state. 
Initially, the research effort focused on compiling data from Rootshell.com, 
Technotronic.com, Packet Storm Security, and Security Focus. Strong and effective remote 
denial of service attacks primarily on software systems were compiled in a Microsoft Access 
database in order to facilitate statistical analysis. When possible exploitation scripts were 
also captured to help facilitate the analysis of the attack origin, modifications, and 
genealogical growth. Overall, more than 300 attacks since 1996 were compiled as entries in 
the database. It should be noted however, that the database is not entirely comprehensive 
over the study. Several attacks published during the study period were of such trivial 
effectiveness that they had little significance as data points. Of prime importance to this 
study are attacks that are either entirely or at least partially successful in achieving the goal 
attack state. 
Taxonomy Trends 
As attack scripts, toolkits, and other exploit programs were entered in the database 
along with their respective vulnerability description each was then categorized according to 
the taxonomy structure described previously. Each denial of service technique was classified 
as being an implementation weakness, brute force, or specification weakness attack 
according to each category definition. Although a description of the vulnerability was 
included, it is once again important to note that only the attack is being classified. Unlike 
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vulnerability classification schemes, attack classification schemes are not necessarily 
concerned with identifying the specific exploited flaw [5]. 
In other words, the research effort primarily focused on cataloguing and script or set of 
instructions that a malicious user could execute in order to reach a state of denial of service 
on the victim system. 
While some may argue that vulnerability classification schemes are perhaps more 
applicable to defining common problems in software, the taxonomies are actually difficult to 
represent when building genealogical structures. Because denial of service attack tools often 
work against several targets, from various platforms, and often exploit multiple 
vulnerabilities on host victims as a means of achieving the goal, they are simply too complex 
to classify according to conventional taxonomies. Instead attacks are classified according to 
the defined category requirements. As a result, these exploits force us into a definition of 
attack that makes classifying with independent classifiers difficult [5]. Unlike the 
conventional vulnerability taxonomies, attack taxonomies often maintain dependent 
classification mechanisms. In other words, an attack may actually be classified as being part 
of more than one category in the taxonomy depending upon its complexity and historical 
growth. 
Because only three distinct categories are used as part of the classification scheme, 
the taxonomy proved broad enough to allow for a moderate but exhaustive means of 
characterizing all attacks. Perhaps more difficult though was the task of analyzing the source 
code accompanying the attack documentation or vulnerability description to determine its 
type and possible genealogical parents. Nonetheless, results proved interesting 
demonstrating a strong trend in implementation weakness attacks as shown in Figure 3. In 
fact, implementation weakness attacks are nearly doubled in the overall percentage of attacks 
catalogued here. Due to the complexity of modem software and hardware packages, these 
statistics may come of little surprise since complicated designs may often be prone to flaws 
or errors. Fortunately, implementation weakness attacks are perhaps the easiest attacks to 
prevent since many of them can either be corrected effectively by vendors or in some cases 
blocked by intrusion detection systems. In addition, the implementation weakness category 
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Figure 3. Attack Taxonomy Trends 
Other 
also provides valuable information on how software vulnerabilities have changed over time 
and have attacks have been modified to overcome such changes. 
Perhaps most significant from a genealogical standpoint and most interesting in attack 
tree structure is the miscellaneous category of dependent attack classifications. In other 
words, all attacks that consisted of more than one classification type placed into an undefined 
category then fully analyzed for its comprising types. As Figure 4 illustrates, most attacks in 
this category actually demonstrate all characteristics defined with the taxonomy signifying a 
strong growth in the complexity of the attack tools as well. In fact studying many of the 
attack scripts in conjunction with their respective attack trees demonstrates how many exploit 
tools began originally as singular implementation or specification weakness attacks and later 
incorporated other attack methods as well resulting many times in an increase in 
effectiveness and often a faster and easier means of achieving the denial of service state. 
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Figure 4. Continuation of Attack Taxonomy Trends 
Given the subjective analysis of attack tools, the database serves an effective platform 
for characterizing the nature of past and existing exploit scripts for conducting denial of 
service. Overall, the taxonomy reveals the proportions of different attack types as well as 
their particular transmission methods and means of obtaining the goal. Of more concern 
however is how each of these attacks and attack taxonomies have changed and grown in 
sophistication over time. 
Specification Weakness Attack Analysis 
Recall that specification weakness attacks are those in which the enemy attempts 
directly take advantage of a flaw, weakness, or security vulnerability in the design or 
specification of a network, service, or communication protocol. As statistics showed in the 
database most often these exploits actually attack the communication protocol, or more 
specifically the TCP/IP protocol. Attack tools such as the classic SYN-Flood and LAND 
attacks specifically target weaknesses in the protocol specification. Since the vulnerability 
remains at the protocol specification level, the attacks are not only difficult to prevent since 
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doing so requires modifications of an accepted and highly implanted communication 
standard, but also demonstrate many of the genealogical patterns of improvement and 
modification important to this study. 
As mentioned previously, hosts implementing the TCP/IP protocol stack are limited 
by the number of half-open connections allowed on any single port at some give time. 
Unfortunately the TCP/IP protocol requires machine resources such as computing time and 
memory to be devoted to each of the half-open connections. SYN-Flood attacks work by 
sending a targeted system a series of connection requests known as SYN packets. Although 
each packet causes the targeted system to issue a SYN-ACK response in acknowledgement 
to the connection request, the attacking system never responds to complete the three-way 
TCP connection handshake. While the victim waits for the ACK completion that follows the 
SYN-ACK response packet, the system allocates resources to the open port connection 
request. The resources continued to be allocated specifically to the incomplete connection 
process until either the attacker responds to complete the connection or and internal timer 
expires on the original attacker request. Since the attacker never responds to fully complete 
the three way TCP handshake, resources on the victim are quickly diminished. Once the 
limit of half-open connection requests has been reached or resources no longer become 
available, the system will ignore all incoming SYN requests, making the system unavailable 
for legitimate users. 
Since TCP/IP does not incorporate strong authentication in the communication of 
network hosts, the attack is extremely successful in performing a remote denial of service. 
Furthermore, there is a requirement for an inappropriately burdensome allocation of memory 
and computation resources on the target side [12]. Hence for an enemy attempting to 
perform a successful denial of service on a system, the SYN-Flood attack approach is 
perhaps an extremely effective and easy means of penetration. 
As a result the attack has exhibited significant improvements and variations since its 
debut several years ago. Originally the SYN-Flood attack script simply attempted to open as 
many incomplete connections on the victim as possible. The attack was effective but 
inefficient and easily defeated by security professionals who simply blocked multiple 
incoming connection requests from a single host. As the attack tree in Figure 5 
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demonstrates, the attack quickly evolved over the next few years into several more 
sophisticated attack tools that still exist as modem means of causing losses in network and 
resource availability. 
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Figure 5. SYN-Flood Attack Tree Genealogy 
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Soon after its inception the SYN-Flood attack was modified by both the original author and 
several others. Shortly following the introduction of the attack, the author released the more 
commonly used modem release, also known as SYN-Flood 97 while others made the same 
simple modifications of the original attack code and released their own modified versions 
including Punk and Slice. The new modifications allowed for source address spoofing that 
make the attacks even more difficult to filter since incoming connection requests all have 
different forged sender addresses. 
In the next year several more modifications were made to the Punk attack algorithm 
including porting the source code to Perl as well as revising the spoofing IP algorithm to be 
random instead of sequential. Once again many security experts responded by attempting to 
analyze forged packets and filter similar bogus connection requests. However the more 
significant changes to the attack came with a revision of the Punk attack script known as 
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Juno. The new TCP SYN-Flooding tool modified the original algorithm for faster packet 
creation and allowed the attacker to emulate different attacker OS platforms. In other words, 
the new attack tools allowed for the possibility of more rapid attacks as well as fooling 
filtering software into determining forged packets had been sent by separate hosts on 
different operating systems. Once again a short time later, Juno vl.01 was developed that 
allowed for even faster packet creation, better OS simulation, and improved random source 
IP generation [17]. In addition a separate work known as Flood2 was also introduced similar 
to the original Juno that conserved network bandwidth on the part of the attacker by 
decreasing the overall packet sizes. 
The modifications and evolutionary growth of the SYN-Flood attack tree 
demonstrates the ability of attackers to improve designs to not only overcome additional 
security measures implemented by administrators but also improve the overall efficiency of 
attacks. Furthermore, the attack tree helps to model how similar attacks may appear in other 
software systems. As attack trees grow, the leaf nodes often spring entirely new methods of 
conducting a similar attack on either different software systems or communication networks. 
For example shortly after the SYN-Flood attack was released, several new attacks were 
developed for the Microsoft Windows platform that simply represented variations of the 
original SYN-Flood idea that exploits the Out-of-Band data assumption [17]. In the case of 
the KillWin and WinNuke attacks, the enemy sender directs a special packet to the host with 
the urgent pointer set. The Windows system responds by immediately allocating resources to 
the request. However, even though the urgent pointer is set and the Windows system expects 
data to follow, the attacker instead continues to follow with more Out-of-Band data 
connections forcing more resources to be exhausted. In fact when sent to the NETBIOS port, 
the service failed to even handle the requests correctly resulting in an immediate system 
crash. 
Unfortunately, researchers may never be able to fully overcome the problems 
associated with specification weakness attacks since many are already inherently part of 
existing standards and intertwined with countless legacy network products. However 
studying the genealogy of attack trees such as SYN-Flood yields valuable data on how 
attacks have changed in the past to overcome new security mechanisms and the underlying 
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vulnerabilities which remain to either still be exploited or in exploited in new ways. Since 
the publication of the SYN-Flood vulnerability multiple similar strategies, including LAND 
and other TCP-Loopback attacks, have stemmed from the same attack methodology. By 
analyzing themes recurrent in different attack trees gain some understanding on both the 
mindset of attacker and the methodology of achieving denial of service. 
Brute Force Attack Analysis 
Recall that brute force attacks are those in which the enemy attempts to overflow or 
deplete computing system resources by some forceful and exhaustive means that relies on 
their own processing power and network bandwidth and the limitations of the system and 
network resources of the victim machine. Often brute force attacks simply work by flooding 
the victim network or system with useless data. Attacks such as Smurf, TFN2K, and 
Stacheldracht all act as extremely effective means of overwhelming the victim systems with 
vast amounts of maliciously crafted packets. 
While some brute force attacks are simplistic and simply overwhelm the victim with 
ping requests, others demonstrate more sophistication and often will take advantage of 
implementation or specification weakness vulnerabilities as well. For example the Smurf 
attack targets a feature in the IP specification known as directed or subnet broadcasting. By 
definition the IP protocol specification allows for both unicast and multicast communication 
transmissions, meaning data packets can be either sent to a single host or group of hosts 
respectively. In order to send a packet to multiple machines, a machine need only to set the 
receiver address to the broadcast address. When a packet is sent to that IP broadcast address 
from a machine outside of the local network, it is broadcast to all machines on the target 
network (as long as routers are configured to pass along that traffic) [18]. Hence any 
machine is capable of sending broadcast messages to all machines on a particular local area 
network. 
In order for the enemy to launch a Smurf attack against the network, the attacker 
forges simply forges ICMP echo requests using the spoofed sender addresser or the victim. 
However, unlike a normal ICMP echo request the receiver address is set to a broadcast 
address. If the routing device delivering traffic to those broadcast addresses performs the IP 
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broadcast function, most hosts on that IP network will take the ICMP echo request and reply 
to it with an echo reply each, multiplying the traffic by the number of hosts responding [19]. 
In other words, a ping request is sent to every host on the network with the reply address as a 
single victim. Once the requests are received potentially dozens of machines then begin 
sending replies to the target system overwhelming both the network with useless data as well 
as the victim's protocol stack. 
Upon its release, the Smurf attack led to a denial of service of many IRC servers and 
their providers. Although effective, the Smurf attack demonstrated many of the same 
inefficiencies as other previous attacks such as the SYN-Flood. Original attacks were 
blocked simply by preventing IP-directed broadcasts at the router or by disabling ICMP 
replies on intermediary machines. However, little could be done to prevent the attack on 
behalf of the victim and as a result the brute force attack quickly grew in sophistication as 
demonstrated in Figure 6. 
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New revisions were released months later that demonstrated faster packet creation by 
interacting directly with the kernel instead of normal library routines. PapaSmurf and Rurf 
both modified the original attacks to grow in complexity and efficiency. However the most 
serious improvements came with newly revised versions of the original source code 
including Smurf vl.1 and vl.2. Not only did the attack increase in speed but also built in the 
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new capabilities as well. New attack engines were capable of scanning for vulnerable 
networks as well as vulnerable intermediaries capable of launching the attack against the 
victim. In fact, version 1.2 even built in sophisticated logging capabilities that enabled the 
attacker to build a comprehensive resource of vulnerable targets to help launch the denial of 
service. Finally, version 1.3 ported the attack to the Windows NT platform increasing the 
ease in which the denial of service attack could be launched by average users. No longer did 
attackers need access to a UNIX or Linux based platform to cause a loss of availability, nor 
did they require a sophisticated knowledge on how to compile and launch the attack. In just 
over a year, the attack had become a user-friendly tool capable oflaunching an extremely 
sophisticated attack. 
While these analytical results may not appear to be entirely surprising, the research 
nonetheless demonstrates the ability of the attacker to improve the denial of service tools and 
adapt to changing security practices, such as filtering IP broadcast traffic at the router. What 
is more interesting though is the fact that once again the attack was ported to a different 
platform soon after release. Just as SYN-Flood had sparked a WinNuke attack creation, the 
Smurf attack was ported to the UDP protocol in a new attack called Fraggle. Much like its 
counterpart, the Smurf attack cousin, Fraggle, uses UDP echo packets in the same fashion as 
the ICMP echo packets; it was a simple re-write of Smurf [19]. Likewise, the Fraggle attack 
also exhibited the same revisions to improve efficiency and effectiveness soon after its 
release. 
Much like specification weakness attacks, there is no means of overcoming brute 
force attacks. By their very design, computers are intended to process data and output 
results. By flooding the data input with useless information and overwhelming the system 
resources, enemies are able to launch quick and effective denial if service attacks. Although 
researchers may never be able to fully overcome the problems associated with brute force 
attacks, studying the genealogy of new attack trees may help to predict future attack patterns 
such as Fraggle. Analyzing the themes in attack trees and trying to predict new or missing 
branches plays an important role in both understanding security vulnerabilities and exploit 
efforts. 
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Implementation Weakness Attack Analysis 
Recall that an implementation weakness attack is any exploitation of a hardware or 
software design flaw that directly threatens the availability of system resources. In other 
words, the attack is an exploitation of security vulnerabilities in the target system. Unlike the 
brute force and specification weakness attacks, implementation weakness attacks are often 
easy to repair since the vulnerability exists only on a certain hardware or software package. 
Once the design implementation is corrected in a manner that patches the vulnerability, the 
systems are often able to withstand the attacks. However, it is important to note that this 
attack category also represents the largest portion of catalogued denial of service tools. 
Furthermore, as the attack trees will demonstrate, the taxonomy also shows several recurring 
themes used by black hats to cause a loss of availability on the target systems. 
For example, in later 1997, a major problem was discovered in the way many vendors 
had implemented the TCP/IP protocol stack. In order to accommodate, networks with 
different maximum date transfer unit sizes and other limitation, the TCP protocol allowed for 
data packets to be fragmented, or broken into smaller pieces such that each packet contain a 
small portion of the original data unit. When fragmented packets finally arrive to the 
receiving host, they are re-assembled and combined to build the original data set. However, 
the reassembly process implemented by several vendors expected that incoming fragments of 
a datagram aligned neatly in a way that data at the start of one fragment immediately follows 
the end of the data set in the preceding fragment. Of course normally fragmented packets do 
arrive neatly and reassemble as expected. However the Teardrop attack deliberately crafted 
packet fragments to cause reassembly problems. 
Normally as new fragmented packets arrived, TCP implementations would calculate 
the amount of memory to allocate to the new packet by taking the difference between the end 
pointer of the newly arrived packet and the offset of the previous packet according to the 
Figure 7. Hence under normal reassembly procedures, the packets align neatly without 
spaces or overlaps. However, the Teardrop attack works by sending the victim specially 
crafted packets such that the calculated value for the new end pointer is actually less than the 
previous offset pointer. This can be achieved by ensuring that the second fragment specifies 
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Figure 7. TCP Fragment Re-Assembly [20] 
a fragment offset that resides within the data portion of the first fragment and has a length 
such that the end of the data carried by the second fragment is short enough to fit within the 
length specified by the first fragment [20]. Although the TCP specification does not allow 
for this problem to occur, the data packets are not properly validated by the TCP stack 
implementations on the victim machines. 
As a result, the implementation module performing the memory allocation for the 
newly arrived packet attempts to copy the data into a buffer already assigned to the previous 
packet. Furthermore, the new total calculated length of the combined data packets actually 
returns a negative size value. Since the implementations expect an unsigned integer, the 
negative size value is actually interpreted as a very large positive integer value [20]. Upon 
such requests, most TCP implementations would either fail due to stack corruption or cause a 
complete system halt and in both cases allowing the attacker to achieve the goal state of 
denial of service. 
Again much like the SYN-Flood and Smurf attacks, the Teardrop attack originally 
appeared as an attack script to launch from Linux and UNIX hosts. Unfortunately, unlike 
other denial of service attacks, the Teardrop could not be easily filtered by firewalls and other 
Internet gateways since fragments are only reassembled by the intended end receiver. 
Protection against the attack was reliant upon the victims to patch the appropriate software 
and firmware vulnerabilities on the affected machines. In the meantime as original software 
patches were issued by vendors to correct the problem, the Teardrop attack grew rapidly in 
sophistication as shown in Figure 8. 
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Originally the Teardrop attack had been coded as a proof-of-concept exploit. In other 
words, the original tools was a simple script to demonstrate the effectiveness of the attack as 
a denial of service as well as a means of testing vulnerable systems. The attack was quickly 
modified though to produce spoofed source address to help hide enemy identification. 
Eventually the attack also implemented smaller padding sizes for the first packet as well in 
order to reduce the overall payload size and increase the overall attack efficiency. In 
addition, tools such as Teardrop2 implemented faked UDP data lengths as well as a means of 
beginning to attack multiple protocol stacks on the victim machine as well as porting the 
same attack to a new platform. 
Perhaps more interesting though is the Bonk branch of the Teardrop attack tree. Soon 
after vendors issued patches to repair the original Teardrop vulnerabilities, the black hats 
responded by varying the original attack slightly. Instead of setting the fragment offset to 
point to a memory segment already occupied by another data packet, the fragment offset is 
set to point to a location far beyond the end of the data packet. The Bonk attack causes the 
target machine to reassemble a packet that is much too big to be reassembled causing the 
system to crash [22]. As vendors scrambled to once again prevent the newly discovered 
attack, many administrators began to prevent the attacks by preventing access to the specific 
port the Bonk tool attempted to exploit. Shortly after, Boink was released to allow attackers 
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to specify port ranges, scan vulnerable hosts, and improve the speed at which malicious 
packets could be generated. 
To make matters worse, several other IP fragmentation denial of service exploits 
exhibit the same themes in the attack trees. For example the Ping-of-Death attack originally 
published in 1996 continued to be used in several other forms, most notably Jolt and SSPing, 
over the course of the next few years while vendors continued to make the same mistakes in 
design of the ICMP fragment reassembly implementations and attackers continued to use the 
same methods of improving attack efficiency and effectiveness. Studying the genealogy of 
this tree and comparing it to other similar attacks yields valuable information on recurring 
patterns in software vulnerabilities as well as exploitation scenarios. 
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ATTACK TREE TRENDS 
Although several key attack trees have been discussed individually, several more key 
important themes portrayed in the graphs have not been discussed. In addition to growing in 
sophistication and complexity, many identified attacks demonstrate other genealogical 
growth as well. For example most of the attacks discussed thus far were published between 
1996 and 1998. However, in 1998 important new attack ideas began to surface that heavily 
borrowed from successful denial of service exploits to date. Both attack generators and 
distributed tools demonstrated the continued growth of attacks in complexity as well as 
hierarchically. 
Growth in Sophistication 
As nearly every attack taxonomy demonstrates, exploits grow in sophistication over 
time. In the most simplistic model attack trees, an implementation weakness is discovered 
and an attack is published which effectively exploits the vulnerability to cause a denial of 
service. After the attack is published, other malicious code authors borrow from the original 
idea and, more often, the source code to make improvements. These improvements typically 
include building a friendlier attack interface, making the attack easier to use, increasing the 
attack effectiveness, or in some case modifying the attack to continue to function on patched 
systems. 
For example, the Trash denial of service exploit was originally released as a simple 
tool capable of generating spoofed ICMP packets with random error codes and types. 
Because the ICMP specification had not been correctly implemented on the Windows 
operating system, the spoofed ICMP packets often caused a complete system failure. A few 
months later after the vendor had taken the appropriate steps to repair the vulnerability, 
Trash2 was released which incorporated new improvements in attack efficiency as well as 
demonstrate the ability to now generate IGMP packets as well. Both improvements may 
have arguably been predicted by security researchers though the study of similar attack trees 
and their growth. 
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Likewise, exploit tools are often soon ported to either different target or attacker 
platforms after their initial release. For example, the implementation weakness taxonomy 
demonstrated a popular attack known as Teardrop. Over the course of nearly a year, the 
Teardrop attack spawned several other important exploits. However while the original 
teardrop attack focused primarily on attacking MS Windows systems, a newly developed 
attack known as Nestea used the same idea to attack Linux, PalmOS, HP JetDirect Cards, and 
several other popular platforms. 
In any case, many attack trees demonstrate a growth in sophistication, complexity, as 
well as versatility in very short time periods. Given the common themes demonstrated 
specifically in the implementation weakness trees, vendors, software programmers, and 
engineers should not only be analyzing their own products and computing systems for 
undiscovered vulnerabilities to improve overall security but may also benefit from analyzing 
the attacks currently being used against other products as well. By studying how a specific 
attack is being used against one platform, researchers may indeed be able to test the attack on 
other systems as well and more importantly predict possible changes in the attack that may 
overcome the newly issued system patches. 
Attack Generators 
Once again in every attack category, exploits grew rapidly in sophistication. With the 
increases in complexity though came new denial of service tools known as attack generators. 
As several· important implementation and specification weakness attacks were being 
published throughout 1996 to 1998, many malicious coders began to build tools that simply 
borrowed from each of the previous effective attack ideas. The new tools, often called attack 
generators or aggressors, once again showed a growth in complexity and sophistication but 
little in the way of efficiency. 
New attack generator tools exhibited two important themes: combination of old 
attacks and randomization of new exploitation efforts. Early attack generators were often 
simply of conglomeration of older and previously published attacks. In other words the next 
logical step for attackers was to combine multiple denial of service exploits into one tool 
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using simple Unix shell scripts [24]. For example the popular Targa attack generator relied 
on eight already released attacks as shown in the attack tree in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9. Targa Attack Tree 
In this case the Targa attack was simply a new interface to several effective attacks, making 
it multi-platform and extremely effective at causing resource loss on various target systems. 
Since many attackers did not completely understand the vulnerabilities that made the 
attacks possible nor what specific platforms the vulnerability existed on, the Targa attack 
probably appeared as an even more alluring tool for launching a denial of service. A tool like 
this has the advantage of allowing an attacker to give a single IP address and have multiple 
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attacks be launched increasing the probability of successful attack [24]. While this particular 
feature of Targa and other attack generators arguably made the new denial of service tools 
easier to use and more likely to be abused by those without a strong working knowledge of 
security, the combination of attacks did result in losses of efficiency on behalf of the attacker. 
Using tools such as Targa, the enemy now had to launch several completely different types of 
attacks against an opposing system of which few, if any, the target may have been vulnerable 
to. 
To make matters worse for the attacker, many of the new generators began to 
incorporate every version of a single attack. Instead of simply including the newest revision 
of the SYN-Flood or Teardrop attack, even the malicious coders developing the attack 
generators demonstrate little knowledge on the how each individual script actually functions 
and what vulnerabilities it exploits. For example, DataPool was released as several different 
versions, the latest of which includes both Nestea and Nestea2 as well as Bonk and Boink. 
Hence the combination of old exploits in attack generators often leads to severe efficiency 
penalties as the same attacks are continuously repeated in several different fashions. 
On the other hand, many attack generators exhibit an attempt on behalf of the source 
code author to possibly uncover new vulnerabilities and attacks by randomizing the denial of 
service effort. For example, another attack generator known as Aggressor as well as the forth 
and final release of Targa, both generate useless TCP/IP packets with random invalid 
fragmentation sizes, window sizes, lengths, types, and other unusual characteristics in 
attempt to discover unreported specification or implementation weakness attacks. 
Fortunately in most cases, these attack generators alone remain far from being efficient or 
effective. 
Attack generators demonstrate both the ease of use of new exploit tools as well as 
their reduction in overall efficiency. Nonetheless, the models demonstrate the importance 
once again of recognizing vulnerabilities that have already been discovered on other 
platforms and ensuring the proper safeguards are implemented for any system under one's 
own direction. As attacks are combined and randomly launched against unsuspecting hosts, 
the victims become susceptible to a wide variety of possibly unpublished vulnerabilities on 
the target platform. 
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Distributed Attacks 
Perhaps the most disturbing trend in the growth of attack trees is the combination, 
automation, and distribution of denial of service tools. Although it was not entirely possible 
to prevent specification weakness and brute force attacks, most Internet hosts increased in 
network bandwidth, processing power, as well as memory resources to a point where it 
became difficult for a single attacker to overwhelm the target system with enough data that it 
would be unable to respond to other legitimate requests. As previous attack methods began 
to meet their limits in less than two years, the next logical step was taken to combine the 
power of a number of multiple systems into a distributed denial of service cluster [24]. In 
1999, several new attack tools were published that combined the strengths of both 
specification weakness and brute force exploits in a new coordinated and distributed denial 
of service interface. 
By installing denial of service attack clients on multiple compromised systems and 
developing a hierarchy of control such that all clients could be issued commands from a 
central location, attackers could now launch their attack from multiple hosts. The first two 
tools to appear once again borrowed heavily from previously published attack tools. For 
example, Trinoo simply coordinated a simplistic UDP flood. By coordinating an attack by 
several dozen client hosts each generating literally hundreds of UDP datagrams, the attacker 
could now overcome the limitations of previous attacks by brute force means. 
Hence many of the attack trees previously discussed spawned new nodes that 
demonstrated both the automation and distribution of new tools. Previous attack tools were 
quickly modified to incorporate attack distribution. For example, Targa was modified to 
create Tribe Flood Network, or TFN. Much like its Targa cousin, TFN supports ICMP flood, 
UDP flood, SYN-Flood, and Smurf style attacks [25]. In addition other attacks quickly 
demonstrated growth in sophistication once again incorporating encryption and other stealth 
techniques to evade capture and removal of clients. 
More importantly, the attack trees now exhibited nodes that were arguably part of 
both the brute force and specification weakness category according to the original taxonomy. 
Distributed denial of service attacks signify a major change in overcoming the previous 
resource limitations of the attacker. Since the power of many is greater than the power of 
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few, coordinated and simultaneous malicious actions by some participants can always be 
detrimental to others if the resources of the attacker are greater than the resources of the 
victim [27]. New distributed attacks simply brute forced many of the previously successful 
attack strategies. Since intelligence and resources were no longer located on the same 
network, both bandwidth and computing resources were conserved on the part of the 
attacker. 
Although the distributed attack tree branch may have been somewhat hard to predict 
given earlier models, many of the future branches of the distributed denial of service attack 
nodes may not be as necessarily as hard to predict. For example, soon after the release of 
Trinoo and TFN, Stacheldracht and TFN2K appeared incorporating new methods of 
encrypting client and attacker communications to ensure that information remain hidden and 
to prevent normal session hijacking. In addition both attacks modified the original attack 
algorithms once again for a slight improvement in efficiency. Just as previous attack trees 
demonstrated incorporation of other attacks, scanning tools, and other features, the new 
distributed attack tools may soon begin to exhibit the same characteristics as well. 
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COUNTERMEASURES AND FUTURE WORK 
While several measures currently exist as means of helping to mitigate the effects of 
denial of service attacks including load balancing, resource throttling, attack detection, 
containment, and filtering, there currently exists no full solution for entirely protecting a 
system against the threat ofloss of availability. For example, CERT and several security 
vendors all advise several appropriate measures a vulnerable host can take in order to help 
prepare and withstand such an attack. However, given the specification weaknesses in 
widely used communication protocols such as TCP/IP and the inherent vulnerabilities of any 
host to a brute force attack, no formidable solution may exist in the near future that will 
entire protect systems from denial of service attacks. 
In computer and network security, very few solutions actually exist though that 
entirely prevent many types of attacks. Instead security is an ongoing process of risk 
assessment. Improving the security of a system requires the users to determine where the 
current vulnerabilities exist, which are most likely to be exploited, and which represent the 
greatest risk. Fortunately, attack trees provide a formal methodology for analyzing the 
security of systems and subsystems [ 16]. In other words, attack trees form a groundwork for 
understanding the process of improving security. 
Typically attack graphs are used by security professionals in order to determine every 
possible means of penetrating a vulnerable system. By trying to determine every method of 
obtaining the attack goal, security engineers and network administrators can they determine 
which nodes in the tree have the least cost to the attacker in terms of both time and dollars, 
require the least skill on behalf of the attacker, and are the most easily accomplished. By 
sending appropriate values to each node, administrators can often determine likely paths of 
system penetration and the possible attack scenarios for an enemy to successfully reach the 
final goal. 
Much like their attack graph counterparts, genealogical attack trees demonstrate 
possible scenarios for achieving some type of attack such as a denial of service. More 
importantly though, attack trees represent the path that malicious users have already taken in 
order to successfully achieve a goal. The genealogical hierarchy of an attack tree portrays 
not only how attacks have changed over time but also how they have not changed. As 
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demonstrated by the Teardrop attack tree, several important paths of attacking vulnerable 
implementations of the TCP/IP protocol stack existed. However, at the time the initial 
software patches were released only one particular method of attack was currently being used 
by the enemy. Soon afterwards as the attack started to become ineffective against many 
repaired target machines, a new branch of the attack tree spawned which exploited the same 
fragmentation vulnerability as before by simply another means. 
Studying the genealogy of the fragmentation exploits and other implementation 
weakness attack trees, software designers can potentially determine what other undiscovered 
vulnerabilities may exist. For example, had software designers fully analyzed the current 
attack tree structure of the Teardrop attack they may indeed have noticed other branches 
within the attack tree that were currently missing as part of the hierarchy. In other words, 
existing attack trees can be analyzed by software engineers as a methodical approach of 
attempting to determine other future methods of attack, likelihood of exploitation, and 
possible new attack trends. By analyzing the current structure and genealogy of the tree and 
attempting to determine currently missing branches, designers gain a valuable tool in helping 
to prevent future vulnerabilities. Just as administrators and security engineers use attack 
graphs as a methodical approach to representing important risks currently exhibited by a 
computing system, attack trees can be used by software designers and patch developers to 
help determine new attack trends and software vulnerabilities. 
Software vulnerabilities exist because it is impossible for designers to produce 
systems which conform to extremely strict security standards without formal proofs and 
validation of the source code. Although many designers take careful steps to prevent 
software vulnerabilities, vendors simply can not predict what flaws will later be discovered. 
Thus attack trees became an extremely important mechanism for building more secure 
software. Should designers analyze the current attack against the system using a more 
methodical approach and determine other likely methods of attack as well as existing attack 
improvements, they may indeed uncover other vulnerabilities that would otherwise not be 
noted until later. 
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In addition, attack trees provide an effective means for other vendors to determine 
whether their products are currently vulnerable to attacks being launched on other platforms. 
Several of the attack trees demonstrated that attackers later ported the attack to a wide variety 
of other platforms each of which was also susceptible to risk. Attack trees provide a way to 
think about security, to capture and reuse expertise about security, and to respond to changes 
in security [16]. Given many of the common themes demonstrated in the implementation 
weakness trees, engineers may be able to gain valuable information on undiscovered 
vulnerabilities in their own software designs simply by analyzing the attacks currently being 
used against other products. By studying how a specific attack is being leveraged against one 
particular software application, researchers may indeed be able to test the attack on other 
systems as well. More importantly researchers may gain the ability to predict possible 
changes in the attack that could possibly overcome the newly issued system patches. 
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CONCLUSION 
As the connectivity of modem computers continues to increase and Internet 
infrastructure continues to expand, the importance of maintaining the availability of network 
and computing resources has become an extremely important and challenging task. Recent 
distributed denial of service attacks demonstrate the serious vulnerabilities that still remain 
within much of the world's electronic communication system and the crippling effects of 
simple to sophisticated attack agents. Although no absolute countermeasure against the 
attacks currently exists, analyzing the patterns, themes, and genealogical growth of current 
attacks yields valuable information on existing software vulnerabilities and possible future 
attack trends. 
By examining denial of service attack history and taxonomy together, researchers 
gain the ability to not only identify existing attacks and possible partial countermeasures but 
possibly even predict future attacks in some cases as well. Although attacks have grown 
increasingly complex over time, many of the same basic ideas and methods for performing 
the attack remain unchanged or only slightly modified. Many of the same attack themes that 
have been uncovered in the past are reappearing in new forms which target different software 
platforms, improve attack efficiency, or distribute the attack among multiple hosts. By 
studying the genealogy of existing attack tools and their hierarchical structure, researchers 
are afforded the ability to study how software vulnerability exploits have changed and 
migrated over time. Building a software vulnerability database of denial of service attacks 
comprised of both singular entries and corresponding attack trees allows researchers to refine 
attack taxonomies, determine existing attack patterns, and even predict future changes aimed 
at preventing some denial of service attacks. 
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